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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are planning the purchase of your first home.
Like many first-time home owners, you apply for a loan from the bank.
Your excitement flourishes when the bank calls you because you
believe that the bank has approved your loan and that you are one
†
JD Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2019; BS Political Science,
University of Wisconsin–River Falls, 2015. I would like to thank Professor Thaddeus
Pope for his guidance throughout the writing of this article. I would also like to
thank the staff of Mitchell Hamline Law Review for their hard work. And finally, I
wish to thank my amazing family—especially my fiancé, Ben—for all their love and
support throughout law school.
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step closer to owning your own home. However, the news you receive
is not so exciting. The bank tells you that your loan was denied
because of an outstanding medical bill on your record. You become
confused and shocked because you have not received any medical
treatment and are not aware of any outstanding bills.
Craig Murdock and his wife found themselves in this exact
situation in 2015.1 While trying to secure a loan for the Murdocks’ first
home, Craig discovered a medical bill for a heart procedure that he
never underwent. Craig spent months trying to convince the hospital
that he was a victim of identity theft before Craig eventually settled
and paid the bill.2 Unfortunately, medical identity theft is becoming
increasingly common.3
The process of resolving medical identity theft places an extreme
burden on victims to prove that they are not the individual who
received treatment under their name.4 However, meeting this burden
can be impossible in some cases, causing the victims to bear the
financial loss of paying for hospital services that they never received.5
This article examines potential methods to revamp the current system
and shift the burden of researching and resolving cases of medical
identity theft to healthcare providers.
This article begins with a general overview of the history of
identity theft in general and then specifically discusses the current
state of medical identity theft.6 This article further examines how and
why medical identity theft occurs.7 Next, it discusses the personal
impact that medical identity theft has on victims and how victims can
respond to medical identity theft and altered medical records.8 Next,
the article covers the current laws and regulations governing medical
identity theft and the evolution of these laws and regulations over

1. Courtney Gerrish, Woman Steals Identity to Procure Liver Transplant, WTMJTV MILWAUKEE (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.tmj4.com/news/i-team/medical-identitytheft [https://perma.cc/EY5L-7TPE] (showcasing the effects that a stolen medical
identity can have on a victim).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Joseph Menn, ID Theft Infects Medical Records, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2006),
http://www.pnhp.org/news/2006/october/id-theft-infects-medical-records
[https://perma.cc/K9LX-UPML].
5. Id.
6. See infra Parts II.A., B.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part II.C.
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time.9 The article then turns to available legal remedies and the harm
that medical identity theft victims suffer.10 It then analyzes several
recommendations regarding how to respond and improve the ease
with which victims can resolve claims.11 Finally, this article
recommends that healthcare providers should bear the responsibility
for researching cases of medical identity theft that have occurred
within their institutions.12
II. IDENTIFYING IDENTITY THEFT
A. Identity Theft Generally
Identity theft is a fast-growing problem, with seven percent of
individuals over the age of sixteen falling victim to identity theft in
2014.13 Fifteen percent of persons age sixteen or older—36.5 million
people—will experience some form of identity theft at some point in
their life.14 Identity theft occurs when “a thief steals your personal
information, such as your full name or social security number, to
commit fraud.”15 Although financial identity theft is often the first
thing to come to mind when people hear the term “identity theft,”
more than 250,000 cases of medical identity theft were reported
between 2001 and 2006.16 Medical identity theft is the theft of
personal information for the specific purpose of obtaining healthcarerelated services, such as prescriptions, personal medical treatments,
and surgeries.17 Although medical identity theft and financial identity
theft are similar, medical identity theft is far more personal because
medical identity theft has the possibility of negatively affecting an

9. See infra Parts III.A.–E.
10. See infra Part III.F.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. ERIKA HARRELL, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2014 1 (2017)
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TBS-3URR]
(providing general statistics on cases of identity theft).
14. Id. at 13.
15.
Identity Theft, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/identity-theft [https://perma.cc/QC2
U-YVN2].
16. Whitney Walters & Axton E. Betz, Medical Identity Theft, 29 J. CONSUMER EDUC.
75, 75 (2012) (explaining the differences between financial identity theft and medical
identity theft and the prevalence of each).
17. Id.
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individual’s future medical treatment, such as receiving an incorrect
diagnosis or prescription.18
There is no debate that financial identity theft is a major problem
in our current society and that victims of this crime suffer
enormously. However, victims of financial identity theft can protect
themselves by demanding that credit bureaus correct their record
based on the Fair Credit Reporting Act.19 Unfortunately, victims of
medical identity theft do not have similar recourses available to
them.20
Data breaches are an enormous threat and concern to citizens
and lawmakers in the United States because of the massive amount of
private information that thieves can steal in one instance.21 Federal
legislation distinguishes between financial identity theft and medical
identity theft.22 This legislative distinction is based on the public’s
heightened expectation of privacy regarding personal medical
information.23 The rest of this section will examine how thieves
commit medical identity theft and the current problems facing the
healthcare industry because of the continued growth of medical
identity theft.
Institutions storing individuals’ personal information have a duty
to ensure that the information is protected.24 The difficulty in

18. PAM DIXON, MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT: THE INFORMATION CRIME THAT CAN
KILL YOU 6 (2006), http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/
11/wpf_medicalidtheft2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/M65X-LB7T].
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 40.
21. Stanley C. Ball, Note, Ohio’s “Aggressive” Attack on Medical Identity Theft, 24
J. L. & HEALTH 111, 122 (2010) (suggesting the development of a national system using
Ohio’s Data Breach Notification Statute as a framework to combat medical identity
theft). The national system would only apply to medical identity theft that occurs as
a result of data breaches in healthcare provider institutions. Id. at 133–38. Other
forms of medical identity theft would not be covered under this system. Id.
22. Id. at 122.
23. See id. The public has given medical information heightened scrutiny
because of the ability of medical information to affect future medical treatment and
diagnosis and because of the extreme difficulty in proving and resolving claims. Id.
Most individuals would consider medical information extremely personal and
essential to protect. Id.
24. The HIPPA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/privacy/index.html [https://perma.cc/5S2C-ENPZ] (“The HIPAA
Privacy Rule establishes national standards to protect individuals’ medical records
and other personal health information and applies to health plans, health care
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properly storing this data occurs when identity thieves undermine the
system of data collection and storage. One hacker has the potential to
cripple an entire company, leaving unexpected and substantial
destruction in their wake.25 Regulations should require healthcare
providers to inform patients when their systems are breached and
personal information is exposed.26 However, because these entities
have an interest in keeping data breaches secret, potential victims of
medical identity theft are often left without notice of a data breach.27
B.

Medical Identity Theft: What, How, and Why?

Medical identity theft, which occurs “when someone steals your
personal identification number to obtain medical care, buy
medication, or submit fake claims to your insurer or Medicare in your
name,” is a particularly personal form of fraud.28 Medical identity
theft is uniquely attractive to thieves because of the many ways that
thieves can use stolen medical information.29
One of the most notorious examples of medical identity theft
occurred in 2006 when Lind Weaver received a bill for the amputation
of her right foot despite still having both of her feet.30 Weaver spent
more than a year trying to clear her medical record of the error, but
was unsuccessful.31 While continuing her effort to clear up the issue,
Weaver suffered a heart attack and was taken to the hospital.32
Several days later, Weaver awoke to a nurse asking her what
medications she takes to treat her diabetes.33 Weaver informed the
nurse that she had never been diagnosed with diabetes or treated for
clearinghouses, and those health care providers that conduct certain health care
transactions electronically.”).
25. Ball, supra note 21, at 115.
26. Id. at 140.
27. Id. at 139–40 (explaining that an organization may choose to disclose data
breaches under certain current regulations).
28. Identity Theft, supra note 15.
29. Walters & Betz, supra note 16, at 75 (stating that stealing an individual’s
personal medical information is attractive to a thief because the thief can obtain
prescriptions, receive routine medical treatments, or even have surgery using the
stolen medical identity).
30. See Menn, supra note 4 (illustrating an egregious example of what is required
for an individual to prove that they were not the individual who received the
treatment for which they are now being billed).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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the disease.34 As it turned out, the thief that stole Weaver’s identity
not only received a foot amputation but also had diabetes. Both the
amputation and diagnosis of diabetes were entered into Weaver’s
chart.35 If Weaver had not woken up, the nurse might have given
Weaver insulin—potentially killing her.36 This case illustrates the
unique harm that medical identity theft creates: the harm is not just
financial—it can affect patient treatment and could cost someone
their life.
Another example of the distinct danger posed by medical identity
theft occurred when Anndorie Sachs, a mother of four, received a
$10,000 hospital bill and notification that her newly born baby tested
positive for illegal drugs.37 Although Sachs had not given birth
recently, the hospital would not accept that Sachs was not the patient
and insisted she was the mother of the child.38 The situation became
extreme when police officers showed up at Sachs’s door intending to
take her four children and place them in protective services based on
the results of the drug test.39 All of this arose because a thief stole
Sachs’s driver’s license and gave birth under Sachs’s name to a child
who tested positive for drugs.40 Once the hospital placed this
erroneous information on Sachs’s medical record, it was extremely

34. Id.
35. Id. (stating that diabetes is a disease that can lead to foot problems that could
require amputation).
36. Id. Here, the hospital called a collection agency and Weaver’s credit score
was ruined. Id. It wasn’t until Weaver threatened the hospital with litigation that the
hospital agreed to drop Weaver’s bill; however, the insurance company refused to pay
the hospital bill because Weaver was not the patient who received treatment. Id.; see
Lorelei Laird, Federal Medical-Privacy Law Frustrates ID Theft Victims, ABA J. (Sept.
2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/federal_medicalprivacy_law_frustrates_id_theft_victims [https://perma.cc/Z7HR-9554] (explaining
the frustration that many victims of medical identity theft must endure when
attempting to prove and resolve claims of medical identity theft).
37. See Caitlin A. Johnson, Protect Against Medical ID Theft, CBS NEWS (Oct. 9,
2006), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/09/earlyshow/living/Consume
rWatch/main2073225.shtml [https://perma.cc/W9M7-P24E] (showcasing the
devastating effect that medical identity theft can have on a victim and their family).
Some hospitals, such as the University of Connecticut Health Center, have started
asking patients for proof of identification before inputting any information into
patient records. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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difficult for Sachs to correct it.41 As of October 2006, Sachs was still
unsure if the thief’s medical information remained entangled with her
own.42 Individuals such as Weaver and Sachs are forced to go through
life with the constant fear that incorrect information in their medical
records could disturb their livelihood, result in harmful treatments, or
even cause their death.
Most medical identity theft cases never make it to court because
of the difficulty in identifying the individual who caused the harm.43
However, in 1996 a case went to trial when a psychiatrist altered
patient records to fraudulently bill for services that the psychiatrist
never rendered; sometimes for individuals who were not even
patients.44 Additionally, the psychiatrist falsely reported severe
diagnoses such as depression, abuse, or drug addiction.45 The court
described the harm that the psychiatrist bestowed upon these
patients and non-patients:
Whether it should or not, the misinformation will almost
certainly have an impact on patients’ lives. It may determine
whether an individual will be given a health insurance
policy; it may decide whether he or she will receive
government clearance; it may affect a whole host of other
situations. Dr. Skodnek’s abuse of trust—and its
unquestionable impact on his patients’ lives and the lives of
their family members—are very, very troubling. And, what
is unusual about this fraud scheme is not that Dr. Skodnek
“puffed” the time he spent but went much, much further. He
41. Id. (stating that Sachs “had to take a DNA test to prove she wasn’t the mother
of the drug-addicted baby”).
42. Id.
43. KAMALA D. HARRIS, MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE AGE OF
ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS, 1 (2013),
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/medical_id_theft_recommen
d.pdf [https://perma.cc/QU22-EKZU] (“Medical identity theft is often underreported,
as it is difficult to detect . . . .”); James Swann,Warning: Your Medical Identity May Not
Be Safe, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 22, 2018), https://www.bna.com/warning-medicalidentity-n57982092785 [https://perma.cc/J3HQ-AH4L] (“There’s no way to trace a
specific case of medical ID theft back to a specific data breach, but providers are under
pressure to secure patient data and prevent it from getting into the wrong hands.”).
44. United States v. Skodnek, 933 F. Supp. 1108, 1114 (D. Mass. 1996)
(explaining the various ways that a victim will be harmed by having their identity
stolen and their medical records falsely altered without their knowledge). This was
one of the few cases of medical identity theft that actually made it to trial and in which
the court found that an individual perpetrator was responsible. Id. at 1123.
45. Id. at 1121.
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created a paper trail for these patients out of whole cloth,
inventing histories of mental health treatment with which
those individuals must now contend.46
These are only a few examples of ways that medical identity theft
can affect a victim’s life. Although they are extreme examples, these
situations could happen to anyone; thieves can steal medical
identities and use them to bill the victims’ insurance plans for services
that the victims never received. Healthcare provider employees who
are attempting to turn a quick profit most commonly perpetrate this
form of identity theft, which rises to the level of medical identity
fraud.47 The employee can steal the medically identifiable information
and sell it to a third party who is “seeking to commit the fraud.”48 More
often than not, medical identity theft is an “insider” crime.49
There are a variety of ways that thieves can steal a person’s
personal information. The most popular method is through acquiring
the victim’s social security number.50 A social security number is not
as hard to obtain as one might think. Healthcare and financial
industries compile personal information—including social security
numbers—and share the information with each other, providing
various opportunities for a third-party to hack or steal the
information.51 One author, Stanley Ball, explained the four most
common reasons that medical identity theft is perpetrated:
46. Id.; see also DIXON, supra note 18, at 5–6 (describing the many ways that
medical identity theft harms victims, including the alteration of the victim’s medical
records).
47. Katherine M. Sullivan, Note and Comment, But Doctor, I Still Have Both Feet!
Remedial Problems Faced by Victims of Medical Identity Theft, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 647,
650–51 (2009) (explaining the different ways that an individual could gain access to
and steal a victim’s identity). A lone individual who is desperate for health services
may perpetrate this crime or a ring of individuals may steal medical identities to
extort money from insurance companies. Id.
48. Id. at 651.
49. DIXON, supra note 18, at 36. Generally, cases of medical identity theft will
involve some kind of healthcare professional; either at the provider or insurance
level. Id. Individuals inside healthcare organizations have easier access to medical
records. Id.
50. R. Bradley McMahon, Note, After Billions Spent to Comply with HIPAA and
GLBA Privacy Provisions, Why is Identity Theft the Most Prevalent Crime in America?,
49 VILL. L. REV. 625, 627 (2004) (describing the importance of an individual’s social
security number in securing personal information and in its use as an identifier,
especially when a photo ID is not required).
51. Id. at 628–29 (“The liberal sharing policies of companies allow personal
information to flow far beyond primary compilers.”).
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(1) “A person uses . . . the identity of another . . . to obtain
medical care because the [person] is uninsured.” (2) “A
[person] uses the identity of another to obtain medical care
because the [person] does not want [his] health records to
include information about his . . . health status.” Specifically,
the identity thief desires to prevent his current or future
employer, or “insurance provider from knowing aspects of
[his] true health condition.” (3) A person uses the victim’s
identity to obtain a drug prescription for recreational use or
criminal distribution. (4) A person obtains the victim’s
health information. Then in a separate incident, the thief
also steals the personal identifying information needed to
pose as a physician and submits claims for reimbursement
to an insurance provider for services never rendered to any
individual. This is not uncommon and can “involve hundreds
of identities and the submission of millions of dollars’ worth
of false claims.52
It is important to first understand how a thief is able to gain
access to a patient’s personal information. When a patient goes to a
medical provider, the provider generally asks the patient to provide
registration information for hospital records.53 This information may
include the patient’s name, date of birth, address, insurance
information, racial background, and social security number.54 The
provider places this information in the hospital’s records for that
specific patient. Next, the patient receives care from a physician
during an office visit. The physician’s office adds information
discussed during the visit to the patient’s medical records, including
the patient’s symptoms, diagnosis, and prescriptions.55 Then, at the
end of a visit, a physician inputs all care the physician rendered into

52. Ball, supra note 21, at 118 (numbering added) (quoting BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON,
MED. IDENTITY THEFT ENVTL. SCAN 4–6 (2008),
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/hhs_onc_medid_theft_envscan_10100
8_final_cover_note_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VQN-AZFV]).
53. See generally Thomas Clifford, Provider Liability and Medical Identity Theft:
Can I Get Your (Insurance) Number?, 12 NW. J.L & SOC. POL’Y 45, 50 (2016) (explaining
the process of patient information gathering in hospitals and how that information is
transferred and stored). Because patient information passes through so many
different hands and agencies, there are many points at which a thief could steal the
information without raising alarms. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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the patient’s record and sends charges to the insurance company for
approval.56
Once the insurance company reviews the services that the
physician provided, the insurance company sends the patient an
Explanation of Benefits statement that discloses the amount the
insurance company will pay.57 The hospital then sends the patient a
bill for the remaining balance.58 Because all these different hands
touch patient medical records, it is difficult to ensure that records are
protected.
To understand how easy it is to find and steal an individual’s
health information and identity, consider this example. In the 1990’s,
the Group Insurance Commission (GIC) released records to the public
that included a summary of hospital visits by state employees in
Massachusetts.59 The GIC gave the files to researchers at no cost.60
The GIC removed identifying information such as names, addresses,
and social security numbers before releasing the files.61 The GIC
believed the files to be “de-identified” and safe to release for
research.62 However, information such as birth date, sex, and zip code
remained on the files.63 A student then purchased the voter rolls for
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and set about finding the governor of
Massachusetts’s personal health history.64 Using this “de-identified”
information, the student was able to determine that only “[s]ix people
in Cambridge shared the Governor’s birth date, only three were men,
and the governor was the only one in his zip code.”65 This case
demonstrates just how easy it is for medical identity thieves to
connect various forms of public information to find medical
information about an individual.
Data breaches are the most prevalent form of medical identity
theft.66 Data breaches occur when there is an “unauthorized
56. Id.
57. Id. at 51.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 49.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 49–50.
62. Id. at 49.
63. Id. at 50.
64. Id. (“Voter rolls included the name, address, zip code, birth date, and sex for
each voter.”).
65. Id.
66. Paige Schaffer, Healthcare Data Breaches Open a Pandora’s Box of Patient
Identity Theft, DIGITAL COMMERCE 360 (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.digitalcommerce3
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acquisition, access, use or disclosure of protected health
information.”67 This article further discusses data breaches in Part V.
C. Harm Suffered by Victims
Medical identity theft affects many parties, including the
healthcare provider, the insurance company, and the victim.68 The
primary victim is the individual whose medical information and
identity has been stolen.69 The victim can experience a lasting impact
that may far outweigh and outreach the consequences of financial
identity theft.70 For example, if the thief used the victim’s medical
information to obtain health services, such as treatment or surgery,
those records remain on the victim’s health history—sometimes
without the victim ever knowing that the history is incorrect.71
Medical identity theft can also negatively impact the victim’s ability to
obtain insurance coverage. If the victim needs medical care or service,
but the thief already received that service by using the victim’s
identity, the insurance provider may deny covering the cost.72
A victim may experience many other lasting effects of medical
identity theft; the least of which is simply the time, energy, and
finances that it takes for the victim to correct the issue and to prove
that their identity was stolen.73 Individual victims may spend as many
as thirty hours researching, resolving, and recovering from the misuse
of their medical information.74 It may take even more time for victims
to amend medical records that contain false information.75
60.com/2017/09/08/healthcare-data-breaches-open-a-pandoras-box-of-patientidentity-theft [https://perma.cc/H8KB-9T3K]; see also Joseph D. Szerejko, Note,
Reading Between the Lines of Electronic Health Records: The Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and Its Implications for Health Care
Fraud and Information Security, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1103, 1122, 1127 (2015) (examining
the effect that the shift to electronic storage of information will have on patients and
healthcare providers in cases of medical identity theft).
67. Szerejko, supra note 66, at 1122.
68. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 651 (examining all the ways in which medical
identity theft affects victims in the short-and long-term).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 651–52 (explaining how medical providers rely on a patient’s medical
history as a complete and accurate account in diagnosing and treating a patient).
72. Id. at 652.
73. Id.
74. See Dixon, supra note 18, at 30.
75. Id.
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Nikki Burton was seventeen years old when she wanted to
donate blood for the first time.76 However, when Burton went to
donate the donation center turned her away without any
explanation.77 Burton was confused about this rejection and
contacted the Red Cross for information.78 The Red Cross informed
Burton that Burton’s file listed her as barred from donating blood
because Burton’s social security number had been used to obtain AIDS
treatment.79 Burton was very confused, as she did not have AIDS.80
Burton discovered that a thief had stolen her social security number
and that an imposter had used her identity to receive treatment.81
In a separate case, the medical records of a woman who was
about to have bypass surgery listed her height as just over five feet.82
In reality, this woman was over six feet tall; if the medical staff had not
caught the error in time, the woman could have suffered serious
complications during surgery.83
Healthcare providers and insurance companies are the
secondary victims of medical identity theft, given that primary victims
generally refuse to pay for services or medication they did not
receive.84 Incidents of medical identity theft could also result in
negative publicity for the business because data breaches decrease
customer confidence.85
Additionally, healthcare providers that rely on inaccurate
medical records for victims of identity theft could be subject to
litigation.86 Stanley Ball notes that the “cost of investigating crimes,
prosecuting criminals, enforcing federal rules, and payouts to
criminals as a direct fraud victim” affects federal agencies.87 Society
76. Clifford, supra note 53, at 46 (listing several stories of victims of medical
identity theft).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (stating that a dosage based on a height more than one foot different from
the patient’s actual height could have devastating consequences because anesthesia
dosage is calculated based on height and weight).
84. See Sullivan, supra note 47, at 652–53 (stating that the provider will not
make the victim pay for the thief’s bill if the victim can prove they were not the
individual who received treatment).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 666.
87. Ball, supra note 21, at 121.
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also suffers because offsetting the costs of fraudulently received
services requires patients to pay more for legitimate services.88
Victims may suffer the most lasting impact from a lowered credit
score due to outstanding medical bills for the thief’s medical care.89
Victims could also have inaccurate medical history records,
potentially leading to incorrect diagnoses and treatments.90
III. REGULATIONS AND LEGAL REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS
Once an individual’s medical identity is stolen, no set framework
exists for victims to correct the error.91 The “current remedies
available to victims leave something to be desired” because the
“burden is entirely on the victim to navigate the healthcare system,
track down all of the disparate record custodians, and convince the
custodians of the victim’s right to amend their records.”92 The Office
of the Inspector General provides information for various agencies
that victims may contact when their identity is stolen.93 However, the
guidance from these agencies is often tangled and unclear, including
multiple referrals to different agencies and no clear answers on how
to address medical identity theft.94
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC)’s website contains a link to
a brochure that walks healthcare providers through the process of
researching claims and counseling patients on how to respond to
medical identity theft.95 This brochure seems helpful at first, laying

88. Id.
89. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 652.
90. See Walters & Betz, supra note 16, at 76–77 (explaining the impact of
incorrect medical records on a patient’s future medical treatment).
91. See Medical Identity Theft, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Sept. 2018),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0171-medical-identity-theft
[https://perma.cc/T3FG-K8SZ] [hereinafter FTC] (providing a checklist for “How to
Correct Errors in Your Medical Records”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, IDENTITY THEFT:
A RECOVERY PLAN 15 (Sept. 2018) (providing a checklist for “Medical Identity Theft”).
92. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 674 (explaining that there is currently no help
available to victims in researching and attempting to prove or resolve their claims of
medical identity theft).
93. Contact Us, OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/contact-us/index.asp
[https://perma.cc/6KD6-MWXF] (providing contacts to “[r]eport misuse of your
personal information, including your Medical Identity,” “[r]eport suspected Medicare
fraud related to Medical Identity Theft,” “[r]eport questionable charges to Medicare,”
and adding that “[y]ou can also contact your local Senior Medicare Patrol”).
94. See id.
95. FTC, supra note 91.
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out a basic “to-do” list for providers.96 However, the brochure is not
at all helpful to a victim who is dealing with a healthcare provider who
does not follow the FTC’s protocol.97 Usually, a victim must fight for
years before a provider accepts that the victim is not the individual
responsible for the fraudulent bill and that the provider should not
force the victim to pay the bill.98 The brochure minimizes how difficult
and extensive the process is for victims.99 Victims must contact every
potential healthcare provider with whom a thief could have used the
victim’s identification to determine whether the provider entered
incorrect information into the victim’s medical history file.100 The
brochure also does not explain how to respond to providers who
refuse to supply victims with their medical records for fear of
violating HIPAA rights.101 Victims need a more extensive framework
for walking through a standard process for resolving their claims.102
Current resources do not provide victims with straight answers on
how to resolve their claims.
Congress attempted to abate this problem through four different
laws103: (1) the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act
(ITADA) in 1998;104 (2) the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996;105 (3) the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (GLBA) in 2001;106 and (4) the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) amendment to HIPAA in
2009.107

96. Id.
97. See generally Sullivan, supra note 47, at 660–64 (discussing the challenges
victims face when trying to report and resolve their stolen medical identities).
98. Cf. Szerejko, supra note 66, at 1152 (“Medical identity theft typically leaves a
trail of falsified information in medical records that can plague victims’ medical and
financial lives for years.”).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. FTC, supra note 91 (explaining how the provider should respond to a victim’s
request for their own medical records under HIPAA).
102. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 678.
103. Ball, supra note 21, at 126–27; McMahon, supra note 50, at 629.
104. McMahon, supra note 50, at 629.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Ball, supra note 21, at 126.
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A. ITADA
The ITADA was the first federal law to provide punishment for
stealing an individual’s personal information or for possessing stolen
identification with the intent to defraud the United States
government.108 The ITADA provides punishment for all forms of
identity theft; not only medical. Punishments range from fines to
prison time up to fifteen years.109 The ITADA is not limited to
punishing only fraudulent uses of an individual’s social security card;
courts even consider the “misuse of a person’s name alone, without
other identifying information” to be an unauthorized use of the
identification of another person and in violation of the ITADA.110
Congress intended the act to serve as a deterrent to any would-be
identity thief; however, the act has not been effective.111
The ITADA has been ineffective because of its focus on
punishment and after-the-fact fixes. For example, the ITADA does not
provide a solution for preventing identity theft or how to apprehend
thieves once they have stolen someone’s identity.112 Since the ITADA
contains little material that details how to apprehend a thief, “the risk
of suffering a penalty is well worth the reward for a potential thief.”113
B. HIPAA
The second law, HIPAA, most effectively deters and limits cases
of medial identity theft.114 HIPAA’s purpose is to provide a framework
for the transfer and sharing of private information between

108. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a) (2003). See generally United States v. Wong, No. 1410294, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12747 (9th Cir. July 23, 2005) (finding a violation of the
Identity Theft Act).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(b).
110. Wong, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12747 at *5 (“A ‘means of identification’ is ‘any
name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other
information, to identify a specific individual.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7))
(emphasis added)).
111. McMahon, supra note 50, at 630–33. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1028.
112. McMahon, supra note 50, at 632–33; see 18 U.S.C. § 1028.
113. McMahon, supra note 50, at 633 (explaining the ease with which thieves can
steal an identity and why the benefits of doing so outweigh any risks for thieves).
114. See generally id. at 644–45 (describing the purpose and enactment of
HIPAA).
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healthcare institutions.115 Moreover, HIPAA attempts to make it
easier for employees to retain the same health insurance when
transferring jobs.116 Even though Congress enacted HIPPA in 1996,
the act did not go into effect until April 2003.117 HIPAA covers privacy
policy in health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare
providers who electronically transmit any health information in
connection with transactions for which Health and Human Services
has adopted standards.118 The specific sections of HIPAA that relate
to health information privacy are the “Privacy Rule” and the “Security
Rule.”119 HIPPA limits the situations in which a covered entity can
disclose a consumer’s personal information to a third party.120
HIPPA’s limits require a patient’s explicit written consent before a
covered entity can disclose the patient’s personal information to a
third party.121
Specifically, the Privacy Rule focuses on regulating disclosure of
health information.122 The Privacy Rule also allows individuals to
review and possibly amend their own medical records for
accuracy.123 The review and amendment portion of the rule is not
absolute and the covered entity can deny any request from a
patient.124 HIPPA’s lack of a requirement for providers to amend
erroneous health information that a patient discovers is a large
downfall, given that the provider will continue to use erroneous
information when diagnosing and treating the patient.125

115. Id. at 644 (“[M]ore than seventeen organizations may handle a single
medical record, and approximately four hundred people may see a patient’s medical
record during one hospital stay.”).
116. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 657.
117. McMahon, supra note 50, at 645; Sullivan, supra note 47, at 658 (explaining
that the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) added the Security Rule in
2003 under the simplification section of HIPAA, and that HHS oversees the security
and privacy requirements of the Security Rule).
118. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
119. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 659.
120. See § 1177(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 2029.
121. McMahon, supra note 50, at 648. This is called the “Opt-In Provision” of
HIPAA. Id.
122. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 659–60.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 660 (stating that providers are not required to allow patients to review
or amend any medical information that the approving provider did not create).
125. Id. at 661.
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HIPAA also contains language allowing individuals to seek an
amendment to their medical records.126 However, HIPPA only
requires a provider to make an amendment to medical information
that the provider or insurer created and maintains.127
The main criticism of HIPAA is that there are too many
exceptions that undermine the law’s purpose.128 Another criticism is
that there is not a proper enforcement mechanism through HIPAA.129
Victims do not have a private cause of action to receive
reimbursement for what they have lost. Only administrative agencies,
not individuals, can enforce HIPAA and impose either the monetary
penalties or prison sentences.130
C. GLBA
The third law Congress enacted to address identity theft was the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).131 This law specifically protects
personal information in financial services.132 The GLBA focuses on
holding financial institutions responsible for protecting the personal
information of their customers.133 The GLBA does three basic things:
(1) requires a financial institution in specified circumstances to
provide notice to customers about its privacy policies and practices;
(2) describes the conditions under which a financial institution may
disclose nonpublic personal information about consumers to
126. DIXON, supra note 18, at 40–41.
127. Id. HIPPA requires only the originating provider to correct errors in
information that the originating provider sends to another provider or insurance
company; it does not require receiving insurers or providers to make corrections. Id.
Even if a physician corrects a patient’s file, there is no guarantee that all the
circulating records will also be corrected. Id. at 41. To further complicate the issue,
many individuals will not be allowed to see their record in the first place because
many providers are concerned that they will be in violation of HIPPA’s privacy
requirements if they allow an individual to view records listing services that the
individual claims to have not received. Id.
128. McMahon, supra note 50, at 649 (explaining the downfalls of HIPAA and how
HIPPA has lost its effectiveness in preventing medical identity theft in our current
society).
129. Id.
130. Id. HIPAA also does not penalize third parties for abusing any personal
information that they may receive from an institution covered under the law. Id. at
650.
131. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-103, 113 Stat.
1338 (1999).
132. § 501, 113 Stat. at 1437.
133. Id.
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nonaffiliated third parties; and (3) provides a method for consumers
to prevent a financial institution from disclosing that information to
most nonaffiliated third parties by “opting out” of that disclosure.134
The GLBA contains the requirements that a financial institution
must meet before the institution can “hand out” an individual’s
personal information to a third party.135 When it was enacted, the
GLBA was the most protective law yet for consumer privacy.136
However, the GLBA still fell short of making a real difference in the
way financial institutions handle personal information. The law
created loopholes for institutions because of its ambiguous
language.137 Thus, individuals have little control over where their
personal information ends up.138 Additionally, no private cause of
action exists for victims, which leaves victims ultimately responsible
for any fraudulent charges under their name.139
D. HITECH Act
In 2009, Congress amended HIPAA through the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH)
Act.140 Under the HITECH Act, healthcare providers covered by HIPAA
must notify individuals if their health information suffers a breach.141
This requirement applies only to unsecured personal health
information.142 Once a breach is discovered, healthcare providers are
required to provide notice to victims within sixty days and the notice
must include each of the following:
134. Id. (describing the purpose of the GLBA).
135. McMahon, supra note 50, at 633–34. Minnesota initiated a lawsuit against
U.S. Bank due to concerns that the bank was selling customers’ personal information
to telemarketers. Evidence later demonstrated that that some of the telemarketers
used the information fraudulently. Id. The lawsuit gained national attention and the
public soon realized that many large banks had been involved in similar practices of
selling personal information to third parties. Id. at 634.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 640.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 643 (explaining that “only the FTC has the right to enforce the GLBA
privacy provisions”).
140. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, § 13001, 123 Stat. 226 (2009) (amending HIPAA to require institutions to
notify all individuals that could possibly be affected by any data breach at that
institution).
141. Id. § 13402, 123 Stat. at 260.
142. Id.

60

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:2

(1)A brief description of what happened, including the date
of the breach and the date the breach was discovered. . .; (2)
A description of the types of unsecured protected health
information that [was] involved in the breach. . .; (3) The
steps individuals should take to protect themselves from
potential harm resulting from the breach[;] (4) A brief
description of what the covered entity is doing to investigate
the breach, to mitigate losses, and to protect against any
further breaches; and (5) Contact procedures for individuals
to ask questions or learn additional information, which shall
include a toll-free telephone number, an e-mail address,
website, or postal address.143
The attorney general of each state has the authority to enforce
each of the provisions.144 The relief that the HITECH Act awards is
limited to an injunction or statutory damages.145 The HITECH Act also
states that any monetary penalty that a court grants must be paid by
the healthcare provider to the Office for Civil Rights to “further
enforce HIPPA’s requirements.”146 Through the HITECH Act, victims
can only recover damages if the state they reside in has decided to
allow data-breach victims to receive a portion of the damages the
provider pays to the Office for Civil Rights.147
E. Red Flags Rule
In 2008, the Federal Trade Commission issued the Red Flags
Rule, which requires hospitals and institutions to implement written
identity-theft prevention programs.148 These regulations seemed to
143. Ball, supra note 21, at 127–28 (citing HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §
13402(f), 123 Stat. 262 (2009)).
144. Id.
145. Id. (stating that the Office for Civil Rights is within the Department of Health
and Human Services).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 128–29.
148. Michelino Mancini, Medical Identity Theft in the Emergency Department:
Awareness is Crucial, WESTERN J. EMERGENCY MED. 899, 899–901 (2014) (“The first is
identifying relevant red flags within an institution’s day-to-day operations, such as
alerts from credit reporting companies, altered or other suspicious documents,
mismatched personal identifying information (i.e., incorrect social security number
with stated address), fraudulent credit account activity and notices from other
sources (i.e., law enforcement). The second element is to detect these relevant red
flags through verification and authentication methods. The next element is to prevent
and mitigate identity theft. This would include notifying a supervisor or law
enforcement in order to monitor and investigate current and existing accounts.
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be a step in the right direction because they placed responsibility
solely upon healthcare providers. However, Congress dimmed that
hope by passing the Red Flag Program Clarification Act (RFPCA) of
2010, which granted many providers an exemption from the Red
Flags Rule.149 The RFPCA effectively redefined what it means to be a
“creditor.”150 The RFPCA regulates only creditors and the revised
“creditor” definition almost exclusively exempts healthcare
providers.151
Although healthcare providers that fall outside of the RFPCA’s
definition of “creditor” are exempt from this legislative change, these
providers “would still need to develop” policies or strategies on how
to prevent or otherwise handle cases of identity theft.152 The Red
Flags Rule seemed like a positive move toward protecting victims of
medical identity theft, but, with the addition of the RFPCA, the Red
Flags Rule ended up being another regulation that, in practice, did not
protect victims at all. Even if Congress had not passed the RFPCA, the
Red Flags Rule did nothing to allow individuals access to amend their
affected medical records.153
F. Emerging Legal Remedies
A new legal remedy is emerging to address medical identity theft.
This remedy has come about in response to the current inadequate
system, which provides no cause of action for victims seeking
reimbursement.154 Imagine that an individual receives a bill for a
Finally, the organization should maintain the program and remain up to date as
identity theft tactics change and new technology, such as biometric software for iris
scans and facial-recognition, becomes more readily available.”).
149. Id. at 900.
150. John S. Servidio & Amy R. Worley, Know Your Red Flags For The Identity Theft
Red Flag Rule, LAW 360 (April 16, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/520990
/know-your-red-flags-for-the-identity-theft-red-flag-rule [https://perma.cc/7JXGD4BS].
151. Chris Dimick, Red Flags Clarification Exempts Most, Not All Providers, J. OF
AHIMA, (Dec. 16, 2010), http://journal.ahima.org/2010/12/16/red-flagclarification-exempts-most-not-all-providers [https://perma.cc/39E3-AFYL]. The
original definition of “creditor” was an entity that “provided a service upfront and
collected payment later in installments, such as a hospital providing treatment to a
patient and then setting up a payment plan.” Id.
152. Id.
153. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 666.
154. Kirk J. Nahra, Lessons Learned from Recent Privacy Litigation, PRIVACY ADVISOR
(Oct. 1, 2007), https://iapp.org/news/a/lessons-learned-from-recent-privacy-
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medical service that the patient did not receive, or a bill for
medication not prescribed to them—it is a fair assumption that this
patient has become a victim of medical identity theft. This
hypothetical situation creates concern for the patient because their
once-accurate medical records now contain erroneous information
that may negatively affect the patient in the future. The patient may
also receive bills for services they never received or requested. This
patient may want to bring a lawsuit against the hospital to recoup
their expenses and correct their medical records.
Courts offer no remedy for victims of medical identity theft,
despite the pervasiveness of the problem. Because the patient-victim
has suffered no “actual damage,” the patient cannot file a lawsuit.155
Courts have defined the “actual harm” requirement in various ways.
In Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank,156 the court rejected the plaintiffs’
claims of negligence because “the personal time and money spent . . .
‘was not the result of any present injury, but rather the anticipation of
future injury that has not materialized.’”157 Other courts have said
that to establish damages, the injury must be “actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.”158 Another hurdle plaintiffs face is
establishing a breach of duty.159 If the provider believes that it
provided care to the patient, the provider did not breach its duty to
provide said care.160
One recent way that some plaintiffs attempt to circumvent this
hurdle is by bringing an individual negligence claim using HIPAA as a
guidepost for the standard of care.161 HIPAA sets requirements that
healthcare providers must follow when handling personal
information; if a plaintiff can show that a provider violated a
litigation [https://perma.cc/96ZJ-2K48] (describing how the “actual or imminent”
harm requirement to move forward with litigation is an impossible hurdle that many
plaintiffs are unable to overcome (citing Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486
F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2007))).
155. Nahra, supra note 154.
156. Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D. Minn. 2006).
157. Nahra, supra note 154 (quoting Forbes, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1021).
158. Randolph, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 6. In this case, a laptop containing the plaintiffs’
personal information—belonging to an employee of defendant—was stolen. The
plaintiffs claimed that identity theft would result and could lead to damages. Id. at 2.
The court reasoned that damages cannot “amount to mere speculation that at some
unspecified point . . . [plaintiffs] will be the victims of identity theft.” Id. at 8.
159. See generally Nahra, supra note 154.
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing Acosta v. Bynum, 638 S.E.2d 246, 250–51 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006)).
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requirement established by HIPAA, then the plaintiff may have a cause
of action against the provider.162
The clearest case that illustrates the use of HIPAA to establish a
negligence claim is Acosta v. Bynum,163 where a psychiatrist let an
office manager access patient records “that were then used to cause
harm to a patient.”164 The court allowed for HIPAA to set the standard
of care; thus, the plaintiffs only needed to show that that provider
violated the standard of care under HIPAA.165 Victims may still need
to establish actual damages, but at least the Acosta standard provides
a framework for victims to use in a private cause of action.166
Unfortunately, the more recent decision in Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA,167 has made it difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in
claims of medical identity theft by stopping their claim before it can
begin.168 The court stated that the plaintiffs did not have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act because the plaintiffs’ injury was merely hypothetical, not
“certainly impending.”169 This case is analogous to data-breach cases
because in both situations a plaintiff seeks to recover for an injury that
could happen to the plaintiff because the risk of theft of the plaintiff’s
personal identifying information.170 The “certainly impending”
requirement to establish standing would eliminate almost the
entirety of medical identity-theft cases resulting from a data
breach.171 This elimination would occur because it is nearly
162. Id.
163. Acosta v. Bynum, 638 S.E.2d 246 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
164. Id. at 253; Nahra, supra note 154.
165. Nahra, supra note 154.
166. Id.
167. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
168. Id. at 401–02 (2013). This case involved several organizations that brought
a suit challenging the constitutionality of section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Act.
Id. at 406–07. The act authorized the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General to conduct surveillance on individuals outside the United States and
individuals who were non-U.S. citizens. Id. at 401.
169. Id. at 401–02.
170. Id. Previously in data breach cases, a plaintiff could recover if there was a
“substantial risk” that a harm would occur as a result of the breach and exposure of
personal information. Id. at 441 n.5. In Clapper, there had been no misuse of any
information and only a possibility of future misuse of personal information. See id. at
401–02.
171. See id. In most data breach cases, a plaintiff has not yet suffered “actual”
damage. Damages only result once an individual’s stolen identity is fraudulently used
by another. Compare Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010)
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impossible to determine whether a patient’s information was
taken.172 Individuals whose personal identifying information was
vulnerable during a data breach would not know whether their
information was stolen until a third party used the individual’s
information.173
In most cases of a data breach, a victim is not aware of any
specific use of their personal information for quite some time.174 This
delay makes it especially difficult to prove that the data breach will, in
fact, cause an injury.175 Accordingly, considering the data breach itself
as the injury for which the plaintiff requires compensation makes the
most sense.176
Some district courts have used the “substantial risk” standard
when determining whether a plaintiff has established an injury for
(holding that the increased future risk of identity theft resulting from a stolen laptop
containing names, addresses, and social security numbers of 97,000 employees was
sufficient to establish Article III standing), and Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d
629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that an increased future risk of harm is sufficient to
confer Article III standing), with Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401 (stating that an objectively
reasonable likelihood that a respondents communications could be acquired at some
point in the future was too speculative to satisfy the requirement that threatened
injury be “certainly impending”), and Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir.
2011) (holding that allegations of possible future injury stemming from a data breach
were not sufficient to satisfy Article III standing because the threatened injury was
not “certainly impending”).
172. There is no way for an individual to know whether their information was
taken during a data breach because although the thief may have had access to all the
information, they may have only taken a portion. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 411 (citing Am.
Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 655–56 (6th Cir. 2007))
(“[C]oncluding that plaintiffs who lacked evidence that their communications had
been intercepted did not have standing to challenge alleged NSA surveillance.”).
173. The alert generally takes the form of an incorrect entry in a medical record
or an erroneous bill for services the individual did not receive. The Court did not find
an injury-in-fact to exist when a “speculative chain of possibilities” did not establish
that “potential injury is certainly impending or is fairly traceable.” Clapper, 568 U.S.
at 414.
174. See Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the Current
State of Data Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 399 (2014) (discussing cases “in
which the plaintiffs’ information has been accessed but that information has not been
used to open bank accounts, make unauthorized purchases, or otherwise harm the
plaintiffs”).
175. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409.
176. See Cease, supra note 174, at 399 (explaining that even when plaintiffs’
stolen information has not yet been used to their detriment, plaintiffs are harmed in
other ways such as “incurring costs for credit-monitoring services, [and] paying the
costs of cancelling and receiving new bank cards”).
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which they are owed recovery.177 The Court in Clapper noted that
even if courts applied the “substantial risk” standard, plaintiffs would
have a hard time demonstrating that the possible future injury was
not too attenuated.178
In a note examining the effects of Clapper, Claire Wilka argued
that the holding —requiring that the substantial risk of future harm
be certainly impending—should not apply when there is a threat of
future medical identity theft following a data breach.179 Wilka also
argued that Clapper did not involve a data security breach and that
courts should hold medical information compromised in a breach to
an elevated standard above that of financial information.180 Although
Wilka’s arguments are persuasive, courts have consistently dismissed
cases for lack of standing when there is a data breach compromising
personal medical information.181
Requiring an injury-in-fact in these situations eliminates almost
any claim that a victim could bring. The injury-in-fact requirement
compels victims to wait around and monitor all activity—which is
impossible—for fraudulent usage of their personal information.182
Such a requirement does not allow a victim to have peace of mind or
to receive compensation for the act that allowed their personal
information to be available and vulnerable to theft in the first place.183
To address this problem, Wilka advocates for the use of the
“substantial risk of harm” standard, which would benefit victims of
data breach by allowing plaintiffs to establish standing before their
information is misused.184 A data breach of personally identifiable
medical information could most likely satisfy the substantial risk of

177. Claire Wilka, Note, The Effects of Clapper v. Amnesty International USA: An
Improper Tightening of the Requirement for Article III Standing in Medical Data Breach
Litigation, 49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 467, 468 (2016) (stating that courts have noted that
“because Clapper did not overrule the substantial risk line of cases, plaintiffs can
establish standing if there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur”).
178. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 441 n.5 (“Plaintiffs cannot rely on speculation about ‘the
unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the court.’” (citing Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992))).
179. See Wilka, supra note 177, at 480.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 472–73; see, e.g., Peters v. St. Joseph Services Corp., 74 F. Supp. 3d 847
(S.D. Tex. 2015); In re Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc. Data Breach Litigation, No.
13-7418, 2015 WL 1472483 (D. N..J. March 31, 2015).
182. Wilka, supra note 177, at 470–71.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 487.
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harm standard because the entity allowed the person’s identifiable
information to be at risk.185 Since medical information is currently the
most sought-after identity information, a substantial risk exists that
someone has stolen any available information and will use it in the
future.186
An obvious issue exists in determining what is considered a
“substantial risk” of harm versus what is a “certainly impending”
harm.187 Courts have not defined the two terms or their respective
distinctions.188 Further, some critics have argued that the threat of
identity theft possibly occurring is not enough to be considered a
substantial risk.189 However, Wilka argues that judicial intervention
is necessary for data breaches of medical information because of the
severity of the crime and because victims are left without recourse
until they can prove a fraudulent use of their medical information has
occurred.190
Unfortunately, numerous district courts have relied on the
holding in Clapper to dismiss data breach claims for lack of
standing.191

185. Id.
186. Medical information is the most profitable form of stolen identity
information. McMahon, supra note 50, at 632–33 (“[T]he risk of suffering a penalty is
well worth the reward for a potential thief.”). Medical records fetch a higher price on
the black market than financial information because of the versatility in the ways in
which third parties can use medical information to impersonate an individual. Laura
Shin, A Decentralized U.S. Health System, Increasing Digitization of Records, and
Demand in the Black Market are Fueling a Surge in Thefts, FORTUNE (Oct. 19, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/10/19/medical-identity-theft [https://perma.cc/UUC9DBLH]. Medical information often contains a complete list of personal identifying
information, such as a name, birth date, social security number, credit card
information, and likely information on physical characteristics. Id. Different parts of
the stolen medical information can be sold to different parties wishing to use various
parts of the file for their unique needs. Id.
187. See Wilka, supra note 177, at 488–89.
188. Id. at 488.
189. Id. at 488–89.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 482; see also Peters v. St. Joseph Servs. Corp, 74 F. Supp. 3d 847, 854
(S.D. Tex. 2015) (finding that the representative of a class action lawsuit did not have
standing because future injuries asserted by plaintiff were speculative and
hypothetical); Green v. eBay Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 WL 2066531, at *5 (E.D. La. May
4, 2015) (finding that plaintiffs did not establish a certainly impending injury-in-fact
and dismissing the case).
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR PREVENTING IDENTITY THEFT
Over the years, several sources have suggested methods to
prevent medical identity theft in the first place and how to improve
the process of correcting a victim’s medical record. One suggestion
was put forth by Katherine Sullivan and states that making the
prevention of medical identity theft a condition of licensure or
accreditation would incentivize healthcare providers to better protect
patient information.192 Sullivan also analyzes a recommendation to
amend HIPAA’s privacy policy.193 Another suggestion, made by
Stanley Ball, recommends that the federal government implement a
policy modeled after Ohio’s law on data breach notification and
expand the policy to cover healthcare providers.194 Yet another
suggestion was made by Thomas Clifford and calls for the adoption
and standardization of Health Information Exchanges, along with
heavier regulations on electronic medical records.195
A. Sullivan’s Suggestions
Sullivan suggests “mak[ing] the prevention of medical identity
theft a condition of licensure or accreditation” for healthcare
providers.196 She argues that the safety goals of the Joint
Commission—an independent not-for-profit entity that accredits
hospitals and healthcare providers197—should be recast to include
“occurrences of medical identity theft as of the Joint Commission’s
‘never events.’”198 Sullivan next argues for technological innovations
such as increased patient identification and limiting each employee’s

192. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 675.
193. Id. at 677.
194. See generally Ball, supra note 21, at 112 (recommending many amendments
to Ohio’s law including expansion to medical providers).
195. Clifford, supra note 53, at 65.
196. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 675.
197. See generally About the Joint Commission, JOINT COMMISSION
http://www.jointcommission.org/AboutUs [https://perma.cc/LCP5-K8LS].
198. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 676. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) has a list of “never events” that are occurrences of egregious medical
error that are not reimbursable by the federal government. See Press Release, Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Eliminating Serious, Preventable, and Costly
Medical Errors-Never Events (May 18, 2006), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fac
t-sheets/eliminating-serious-preventable-and-costly-medical-errors-never-events
[https://perma.cc/6MC5-B2ND].

68

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:2

access to medical records.199 The most practical suggestion Sullivan
makes is amending HIPAA’s current privacy policy to allow a private
cause of action against healthcare providers and to strengthen a
victim’s right to view and amend their healthcare records.200 Allowing
a private cause of action against healthcare providers would give
victims a way to be reimbursed when identifying the individual thief
is impossible.
The final suggestion that Sullivan proposes is to create a “Health
Care History Report,” much like the current Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act (FACTA) report.201 Individuals would receive free
access to an annual report that would contain any and all medical
services that were related to the individual’s social security
number.202 Although an individual would need to request the yearly
report, the individual would receive the report at no cost.203 Similar
to the FACTA report, this system would also allow an individual to
place a fraud alert or a hold on their report, which would notify the
individual if any changes were made or if any health services were
requested.204 Sullivan explains that although a “Health Care History
Report” would provide the most protections for victims,
implementing this system in practice would be extremely difficult.205

199. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 676.
200. See id. at 677–78. Subjecting healthcare providers to private causes of action
could incentivize providers to establish stricter policies to prevent medical identity
theft in the first place. Id. at 678. A victim already has the legal right to view and
amend their medical records if they request, put forth in a clarification by the HHC
and the FTC. See FTC, supra note 91. However, having this right specifically stated in
the Privacy Rule of HIPAA may make it clearer to providers.
201. See Sullivan, supra note 47, at 678. FACTA is an amendment to the Fair Credit
Reporting Act that Congress added in 2003 to protect consumers from identity theft.
See generally Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat.
195215 (2003). This act gives consumers the right to obtain one free credit report a
year from credit reporting agencies. Id. FACTA also includes a section that lets
consumers place fraud alerts on their credit files. Id.
202. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 678–79.
203. Id. at 679.
204. Id.
205. Id. Because there are too many agencies in charge of medical records, it
would be impossible to have one aggregated system like the one under FACTA. Id. at
679–80. There is also the issue of the cost to upkeep such a system. Id. at 680. Sullivan
explores further options for how to finance this report in the remainder of her note
and comment. Id.
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B. Ball’s Suggestion
Stanley Ball made another suggestion in his note, Ohio’s
“Aggressive” Attack on Medical Identity Theft.206 In his note, Ball
argued that the federal government should implement a system
similar to the Ohio system—expanded to cover healthcare
providers—to combat cases of medical identity theft.207 Specifically,
Ball argued that the Ohio legislature should expand its data-breach
notification law to cover healthcare providers—specifically, that
healthcare providers in Ohio should not have any exceptions to
notifying patients when a data breach occurs; data breach legislation
should require that healthcare providers destroy patient records
when disposing of them; and victims of medical identity theft should
have a mechanism to collect monetary penalties from healthcare
providers who do not adhere to this legislation.208
Ohio’s data-breach law requires that businesses notify Ohio
residents of any data breaches if the following conditions are met: (1)
a business discovers or is notified of a breach to its information
system; (2) the business knows or reasonably believes that an
unauthorized person accessed and acquired an Ohio resident’s
personal information; and (3) business reasonably believes that the
access and acquisition of the Ohio residents information creates a
material risk of identity theft or other fraud.209
Unfortunately, Ohio expressly decided to not broaden this
legislation to include the protection of an individual’s health
information.210
C. Clifford’s Suggestions
Thomas Clifford analyzed Ball’s proposal in his article Provider
Liability and Medical Identity Theft: Can I Get Your (Insurance)

206. Ball, supra note 21, at 111.
207. See generally id. (arguing that the federal government could benefit from a
system like Ohio’s, which requires providers to notify individuals when there has
been a data breach that could affect their information and penalizes institutions for
failing to provide this notification).
208. Id. at 113. Four proposals are set out in Ball’s note. Id. Disposing of medical
data properly is especially important to combat medical identity theft because Ball
explains that careless document disposal persists. Id. at 140.
209. OHIO REV. CODE § 1349.19(B)(1) (2007).
210. Ball, supra note 21, at 133.
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Number?211 Clifford found that Ball’s “recommendation that the state
law handling patient data protection should adopt more consumer
remedies for breach of personal medical information is strong.”212
Clifford went on to explain that it is important for citizens to have
some way of recovering monetary damages in instances of medical
identity theft.213
Additionally, Clifford provided several new recommendations for
ways the government could better protect patients.214 The first
recommendation was “the widespread adoption and standardization
of Health Information Exchanges (HIEs), alongside regulation for
electronic medical record interoperability.”215 Clifford argued that
HIEs provide immense benefit to patients because HIEs aggregate
every patient’s medical records; therefore, any healthcare provider
can access a patient’s complete medical record.216 However, Clifford
noted that HIEs have limitations because HIEs consist of a variety of
records from various medical institutions, so any incorrect
information can be easily duplicated and circulated faster than it
otherwise would.217
Although HIE’s may be helpful in some situations for easier
access to information from all healthcare providers, implementing
this system for the storage of all records may be too difficult.218
However, Clifford argued for a standardization of all medical record

211. Clifford, supra note 53, at 59–60.
212. Id. (quoting Ball, supra note 21, at 133).
213. Clifford, supra note 53, at 59–60.
214. Id. at 65.
215. Id. HIEs are organizations that collect all electronically stored information,
such as patient data, in one place and allow for the sharing of that information
between providers. Id. at 57. The American Medical Association is an advocate of
utilizing HIEs for the sharing of medical information. Id. HIEs could eventually be
morphed into personal health records (PHRs) which are “personal collections of
health information that are owned and controlled by the patient.” Id. at 67.
216. Id. at 57.
217. Id. If a thief uses an individual’s identity to receive medical treatment under
the victim’s name, the provider will enter that medical care into the HIE under the
victim’s name and health history, making the identity misuse much more difficult to
catch before it is circulated. Id.
218. Id. at 65–66. Every healthcare provider stores patient data differently. Some
use open-ended questionnaires, in which the doctor fills in a blank after questions
such as age, height, symptoms, diagnosis, etc. Other providers use checklists that list
possible answers and physicians simply check off the ones that apply. Id. at 66.
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keeping in healthcare provider practices.219 Requiring all healthcare
providers to store their data in a uniform format would allow for an
accurate HIE system and for all healthcare providers to have the same
access to information.220 Clifford further argued that the federal
government should require that HIEs include a system that allows
patients to request copies and amend their total record.221
Other individuals who have researched medical identity theft
argue that there should be a better system of admitting individuals at
the front door of a healthcare provider’s office to prevent the theft
from occurring in the first place.222 The amount of individual cases of
medical identity theft would likely decrease as a result of requiring
individuals to present a driver’s license or passport before receiving
healthcare service.223 However, this requirement hardly addresses
the fraud rings that perpetrate mass cases of medical identity theft.224
These proposals, while helpful, do not focus on relieving victims
of medical identity theft from the responsibility of researching and
resolving their claims in some way.225 A more patient-protective and
efficient proposal would be to require healthcare providers to be
responsible for researching and resolving claims of medical identity
theft or medical identity fraud. Healthcare providers are in the best

219. Id. at 66; see also AMA Calls for EMR Standardization to Ease Physician Use,
FIERCE HEALTHCARE (June 23, 2011), https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/ehr/amacalls-for-emr-standardization-to-ease-physician-use [https://perma.cc/FPL74GG3].
220. Clifford, supra note 53, at 66 (explaining that the financial impact of such a
system would save the healthcare industry an estimated eighty-one billion dollars).
221. Id. Having a uniform system where patients can amend any of their medical
records would be a significant convenience for patients. Id. Currently, patients must
contact each entity that has any health records and amend each record individually.
Id.
222. Dixon, supra note 18, at 13. In theory, a more thorough intake of patients
would uncover the lone fraudster who has stolen someone’s license or social security
number. Id. Healthcare providers may be able to stop some smaller forms of medical
identity theft by requiring patients to present photo identification. Id.
223. Id. at 7. Some hospitals have already implemented these types of procedures
after becoming aware of incidents of medical identity theft at their institutions. Id.
One such institution was the University of Connecticut Health Center, which began
checking patient’s driver’s licenses after a case of medical identity theft. Id.
224. Id. at 53. Mass cases of medical identity theft may occur when a ring of
thieves is systematically “billing and changing medical files without ever stepping
foot in the healthcare provider’s office or seeing a single patient.” Id.
225. See Clifford, supra note 53, at 61; see also Ball, supra note 21, at 127–28;
Sullivan, supra note 47, at 647.
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position to research and resolve a claim of medical identity theft with
a limited expenditure of cost and time. Healthcare providers should
not require victims to resolve their own claims of theft and fraud that
occurred because of a healthcare provider’s negligence in securing
their patient’s personal identifying information. As Clifford points out:
Patients whose personal data has been breached, and who
subsequently sustained harm, such as a loss of medical
identity, should be able to receive fair compensation,
including, but not limited to, the actual process of restoring
one’s identity security, accuracy of medical records, and
credit rating. In particular, they should be reimbursed for
time and expenses related to interacting with the credit
agencies and to remove fraudulent charges.226
At the very least, patients should have an avenue to collect the
monetary expenses they have incurred in trying to resolve and correct
their medical records.
V.

SHIFTING THE INVESTIGATIVE BURDEN TO PROVIDERS

It is almost impossible for victims of medical identity theft to
investigate and correct the issue on their own. Unfortunately, HIPAA
creates administrative roadblocks that victims cannot navigate. The
very purpose of HIPAA is to prevent unqualified third parties from
gaining access to a patient’s personal information.227 However,
healthcare providers incorrectly believe that HIPPA denies access of
information to a victim of identity theft who seeks information
surrounding the care they supposedly received, even though the
victim received the bill and the provider recorded care under the
victim’s medical history.228
Healthcare providers must be required to develop their own
institutional policies to address claims of medical identity theft.229
Having such policies in place would educate all members of the
healthcare institution on the importance of prevention and detection
of medical identity theft.
226. Clifford, supra note 53, at 63 (responding to Ball’s proposal for more
stringent data protection measures).
227. See generally Sullivan, supra note 47, at 660–62 (explaining that because
patients are unable to view their fraudulent records due to healthcare providers’ fear
of violating HIPAA, victims are often unable to solve claims of medical identity theft).
228. Id.
229. See generally Mancini, supra note 148, at 901 (analyzing how emergency
room providers’ awareness of medical identity theft is crucial to prevention).
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Because an identity thief’s medical records are also protected
under HIPAA, significant confusion exists among healthcare providers
about whether HIPAA prohibits the release of a victim’s medical
records to the victim.230 Many providers believe that releasing
medical records—containing information on services or care
rendered to an individual using the victims stolen identity—to the
victim violates HIPAA.231 There is so much confusion on this issue that
in 2015 the chairs and ranking members of the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, and the Senate Committee on
Finance sent a letter to the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) requesting clarification.232 The FTC and the HHS previously
attempted to address and answer these issues in 2011233 and
developed a pamphlet to aid providers in resolving claims of medical
identity theft and in responding to victim’s concerns.234 The pamphlet
states:
The HIPAA Privacy Rule gives people the right to copies of
their records maintained by covered health plans and
medical providers. . . . Some medical providers and health
plans believe they would be violating the identity thief’s
HIPAA privacy rights if they gave victims copies of their own
records. That’s not true. Even in this situation patients have
the right to get copies of their records.235

230. Adam H. Greene, Confusion Continues Over Medical Identity Theft Victim
Rights under HIPAA, PRIVACY & SECURITY L. BLOG (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://www.privsecblog.com/2015/12/articles/healthcare/confusion-continuesover-medical-identity-theft-victim-rights-under-hipaa [https://perma.cc/8V6FJD6P] (illustrating that many healthcare providers hold this belief because providers
are essentially allowing an individual to see another patient’s records, even though
those records are under the individual’s name).
231. Id.
232. Id. The letter stated that “[w]hile patients have the right to view and request
corrections to their medical records under the . . . [HIPPA] Privacy Rule, there is
widespread confusion about how this rule applies in the case of a thief’s information
being comingled with that of his or her victim’s” and that the “Ponemon Institute
reported that nearly one in five victims of medical identity theft were refused access
to their medical records ‘due to laws protecting the privacy of the identity thief.’” Id.
233. Id.
234. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT: FAQS FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
AND HEALTH PLANS (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plainlanguage/bus75-medical-identity-theft-faq-health-care-health-plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X2U2-8KHR].
235. Id. at 45.
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Despite the FTC and the HHS’s attempt to resolve the confusion
plaguing healthcare providers, confusion remains. The letter
requesting additional clarification in 2015 highlights this lingering
confusion.
Sullivan explored how the creation and handling of medical
records creates an impossible maze for victims of medical identity
theft to navigate.236 Sullivan argued that most healthcare billing and
recording systems have not been updated as the financial systems
have, and so have not evolved with the increasingly complicated
diagnostic technology of healthcare.237 Sullivan also examined the
difference between financial transaction processing and medical
claims billing, focusing on which process is more protective of
patients’ medical information.238
There are currently very few legal remedies that a victim of
medical identity theft can pursue.239 With so much confusion
surrounding how to handle victims’ medical record requests, the
safest and most efficient way to resolve claims is to have the provider
take responsibility for researching and resolving claims of medical
identity theft and to cover all fees associated with any necessary
corrections. When hospitals themselves are not allowing patients
access to their medical records for fear of a HIPAA violation against
the thief’s rights, requiring the victim to attempt to remedy the
situation does not make sense.
Providers and some scholars argue that a burden shift is not
appropriate because too much responsibility would fall on small,

236. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 65354.
237. Id. at 654. The culmination of laboratory work, pharmacists, specialists, and
third-party diagnostic services all required for one doctor visit results in multiple
people touching a patient’s records and distributing those records to multiple
institutions outside of the primary healthcare provider’s office. Id. Healthcare
providers (or the patient) must also send a detailed record of each service to the
patient’s insurance company, who then creates an additional record. A hospital stay
requires granting even more individuals access to view and to change medical
records. Id.
238. Id. at 655.
239. See Clifford, supra note 53, at 58–67 (offering suggestions to prevent medical
identity theft); Sullivan, supra note 47, at 674–81 (offering suggestions to detect
medical identity theft and regulate patient information in the healthcare industry).
See generally Dixon, supra note 18, at 8–9 (explaining the few ways that victims of
medical identity theft can report their cases).
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independent practitioners.240 However compelling this argument
may be, it does not outweigh the potential benefits of a healthcare
system that takes responsibility for protecting patients’ privacy.
In addition to requiring healthcare providers to investigate any
claims of medical identity theft, laws should also require healthcare
providers to use electronic records. Electronic records, when handled
correctly, allow for a centralized record keeping system.241 Having a
centralized system makes it easier for healthcare providers to confirm
and correct patients’ medical records.242
The former attorney general of California recognized medical
identity theft as the “privacy crime that can kill”243 and developed a
guide for addressing the problem. The guide offers several
recommendations to healthcare providers when responding to claims
of medical identity theft, including “[i]mplement[ing] an identity theft
response program with clear written policies and procedures for
investigating a flagged record,” and “[t]rain[ing] staff in all relevant
departments on these policies and procedures.”244 Additionally, the
guide states that the “responsibility for preventing, detecting and
mitigating medical identity theft lies primarily with the healthcare
industry; although patients can also help.”245 The purpose of the
California attorney general’s guide was to offer ways to help
healthcare providers and related organizations develop better
practices that will “promote and protect individual privacy right.”246

240. Clifford, supra note 53, at 65 (explaining that the burden placed on small,
independent practitioners does create a problem, but that the problem may not
outweigh the need to protect patient identity).
241. Dixon, supra note 18, at 9–10. If not handled correctly, an electronic record
keeping system could make stealing patient data even easier for thieves. Id. at 10.
“Digitized information is much more portable and lends itself to rapid transmission.”
Id. Because an electronic system also allows for the easy perpetuation of incorrect
data, electronically connected healthcare systems could “percolate [incorrect data]
through a nationwide system.” Id.
242. See id.
243. HARRIS, supra note 43, at i (laying out suggestions and recommendations for
healthcare providers in California to follow when addressing claims of medical
identity theft).
244. Id. at iii. Harris also recommended “[o]ffer[ing] patients who believe they
may be victims of identity theft a free copy of the relevant portions of their records to
review for signs of fraud.” Id.
245. Id. at 2. This statement is in opposition to our current system where patients
are responsible for resolving their own claims.
246. Id. at 3.
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States and the federal government could use the guide as a
blueprint for mandating a process for dealing with cases of medical
identity theft. The guide advocates implementing a follow-up
procedure for patients claiming that their bills include medical
information that does not belong to them.247 This course of action first
involves gathering all of the necessary patient information. Once that
is completed, the healthcare provider places the patient’s financial
obligations on hold while a team investigates the issue.248
If the team determines that a medical identity theft occurred,
clear policies should be in place and followed for handling the
corrupted records.249 Healthcare providers must make corrections to
victims’ records in the appropriate manner based on the particular
circumstances.250
Some providers and scholars object to this burden shift,
reasoning that the responsibility placed on providers would be too
great.251 This is mostly a financial argument, claiming that smaller
providers will not be able to meet the financial requirements of a
burden shift and will no longer be profitable.252 This is a valid
argument and one that merits brief analysis. Even though this burden
shift will be financially taxing, it will be more cost-effective in the long

247. Id. at 9–10. For example, healthcare providers could use a form with predetermined questions when interviewing a patient for details about the complaint. Id.
at 9.
248. Id. In cases where the individual is not a patient, the provider should still
investigate the claim in the same manner. Id. at 9–10. If the provider determines that
medical identity theft occurred, then the provider should notify the individual and
give the individual thorough information on how to proceed. Id. at 10.
249. HARRIS, supra note 43, at 5 (setting forth suggestions and recommendations
for healthcare providers in California to follow when addressing claims of medical
identity theft).
250. Id. This could mean many things: removing the incorrect information;
leaving the information but noting clearly that it does not belong to the victim;
creating a new file for the victim; notifying all relevant parties; and notifying the
victim of the steps taken to correct the issue. Id. Further suggestions include creating
separate files labeled “medical identify theft.” Id. Ideally, this would allow for moving
the incorrect information contained in a victim’s file to a new, centralized location. Id.
251. Clifford, supra note 53, at 65 (reasoning that small healthcare facilities would
face an undue financial burden in implementing policies and procedures and possibly
employing additional personnel to research and resolve medical identity theft
claims).
252. Id. This burden may not be affordable for some smaller providers to
implement upfront. Id.
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run.253 Placing the responsibility on providers to resolve claims
would make the patient intake process more effective regarding
identity theft prevention.254 Providers would exercise more care
when investigating claims of medical identity theft to avoid the cost of
resolving future claims.255 Clifford echoed this idea in advocating for
a liability shift from patients to providers.256
Placing the liability on healthcare providers would incentivize
better practices to determine patient identity.257 From an economic
standpoint, Clifford argued that providers should bear the burden.258
Economic efficiency determines liability for negligence and strict
liability in cases where the questions are “who can most efficiently
reduce the risk of this problem . . . [and]…who benefits from this risk
and therefore should bear the cost?”259 Much like the credit card
industry—which has been required to establish policies to prevent
and detect financial identity theft through recognizing unauthorized
uses of personal information—healthcare providers should be
required to implement similar systems.260 If healthcare providers are
legally required to bear the financial risk, they will be far more likely
to work to prevent medical identity theft in the first place.261
VI. CONCLUSION
Medical identity theft is a crime that leaves victims with financial
losses, emotional stress, and the possibility of incorrect medical
records. Because this crime is so personal, it is extremely important
253. See generally Sullivan, supra note 47 (calling for a better intake system in
healthcare facilities). Providers would avoid having to pay out services that were
fraudulently received if they develop the proper systems to avoid providing the
service to thieves in the first place.
254. See id. Providers would not want the responsibility of paying for services of
individuals who claim their medical identities stolen and did not receive the services
given.
255. See id.
256. Clifford, supra note 53, at 61.
257. Id. at 63.
258. Id. at 61–63.
259. Id. at 61 (quoting Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of
Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1393 (1987)).
260. See id.
261. Id. at 63. The financial risk entails the amounts that are required for the
research and resolution of claims of medical identity theft. Clifford recommends using
specific statutes to “ensure that patients receive the most protection in the
unfortunate event of medical identity theft.” Id. at 62.
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that victims have a method to correct their records and report any
claims. With the current system, it is nearly impossible for victims to
resolve claims on their own.262 Providers feel as though they are not
allowed to provide victims with their own medical records for fear of
violating HIPAA’s privacy policies.263 To repair this system,
healthcare providers must be the ones to research and resolve claims
of medical identity theft because they are in the best position to
efficiently resolve these issues and protect patient information.264
Thus, by shifting the burden to healthcare providers, claims
would be more efficiently resolved, and patients’ information will be
corrected faster, resulting in fewer complications related to incorrect
medical information in patient records.265

262. Sullivan, supra note 47, at 653–57 (explaining the roadblocks that a victim
of medical identity theft faces when trying to research and amend their medical
records). Most of the problems are due to healthcare providers’ misunderstanding of
HIPPA regulations. Id. at 662; see also Greene, supra note 230. Healthcare providers
are mainly concerned that they will be in violation of HIPAA if they provide an
individual with medical records after that individual has claimed that their identity
has been stolen and that their records contain a service that they had never received.
Clifford, supra note 53, at 53; Greene, supra note 230.
263. Greene, supra note 230.
264. Clifford, supra note 53, at 61–63.
265. Id. at 63.

Mitchell Hamline Law Review
The Mitchell Hamline Law Review is a student-edited journal. Founded in 1974, the Law
Review publishes timely articles of regional, national and international interest for legal
practitioners, scholars, and lawmakers. Judges throughout the United States regularly
cite the Law Review in their opinions. Academic journals, textbooks, and treatises
frequently cite the Law Review as well. It can be found in nearly all U.S. law school
libraries and online.
mitchellhamline.edu/lawreview

© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
875 Summit Avenue, Saint Paul, MN 55105

mitchellhamline.edu

